Macroeconomics Unemployment

Nicola Viegi

March 2020

The Defining Charachteristics of the South African Economy




SOUTH AFRICA UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

SOURCE: WWW.TRADINGECONOMICS.COM | STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA


◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆臣▶ ◆臣▶ 三臣 - のへで

The Defining Characteristics of the South African Economy



2a

2.pdf Source: SA Reserve Bank and Stats SA



 Hystereris (Blanchard and Summers 1987) -Permanence of Demand Shocks

- With Full Competitive Wage Flexibility No Involuntary Unemployment
- Unemployment: Real Wage Do Not Adjust to Equalize Demand and Supply of Labour
- ► To Have Unemployment there Must Be Some Wage Rigidity
 - Short Run Cyclical Unemployment (Correlated with GDP Fluctuations - Wages Adjust slowly - Nominal Wage Rigidity)
 - Long Run Structural Unemployment Long Run REAL wage rigidity (The market does not clear)

Theories of Equilibrium Unemployment

- "Search" Models Voluntary Waiting To Maximise the Probability to Find a "Good" Job
- "Frictional Unemployment" Time Lag in moving between Jobs

No Effect on Real Wage - Labour Market Perfectly Competitive, But in a Dynamic Setting Unemployment as Steady State Transition of workers Between Jobs

- Efficiency Wage Models Productivity of Labour function of Wage Levels
- Bargaining Models Monopoly Power in the Labour Supply, Trade Unions

Equilibrium Unemployment: Efficiency Wage Models

- Labour Productivity depends on the real wage paid by firms
- Firms may find unprofitable to cut wages in presence of involuntary unemployment, to keep productivity up

attract higher quality applicants reduce turnover improve health of workers

 If wage cuts harm productivity, cutting wages may end up raising labour costs - wages could be set above-equilibrium resulting in unemployment

Basic Efficiency Wage Relationship

Single Firm Chooses Wage Offer and number of Employees to Maximise Profits

$$\max \pi = zR\left(a\left(w\right)L\right) - wL$$

where a(w) shows that productivity of labour is a function of the real wage w and the revenue function R(a(w)L) could be anything (in a competitive market it will be pY(a(w)L).

$$\frac{\delta \pi}{\delta L} = zR'(a(w)L)a(w) - w = 0$$

$$\frac{\delta \pi}{\delta w} = zR'(a(w)L)a'(w)L - L = 0$$

The wage rate should be set so that:

$$\frac{wa'(w)}{a(w)} = 1$$

Basic Efficiency Wage Relationship

A Profit Maximising Firm which is unconstrained in hiring will offer a real wage w^{*} which satisfies the condition that the elasticity of effort with respect to the wage is unity

 $w^* = \text{Efficiency wage}$

- Labour Demand for the individual firm where marginal productivity of labour zR' (a (w*) L*) a (w*) equal the efficiency wage w*.
- ► If aggregate L* (w*) < L^s (w*) Some unemployed workers willing to work are unable to find a job - Equilibrium Unemployment

Efficiency Wage Relationship

Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device

- Monitoring workers effort is costly
- Real wage as incentive to work
- Workers Effort affected by cost and probability of Unemployment
- The Market Equilibrium shows involuntary unemployment

Shapiro and Stiglitz Model Workers

- ▶ *N* number of workers, *L* number of workers employed, $\frac{N-L}{N} = u$ unemployment rate
- ► Workers choose the level of effort e, equal to 0 or some fix positive value, that maximises the inter-temporal utility function U (w (t), e (t)).
- ► Worker faces a constant probability of unemployment b, which provide an unemployment benefit w. If worker shirks, the probability of being caught and fired is q

Shapiro and Stiglitz Model Workers

The choice of effort will be based on the comparison between:

- $V_E^N = Expected$ Utility of Being Employed and Non Shirking
- $V_E^S = Expected$ Utility of Being Employed and Shirking
- V_u = Expected Utility of Being Unemployed

Expected Utility of a Non-Shirker Worker

$$rV_E^N = w - e + b\left(V_u - V_E^N\right) \rightarrow V_E^N = \frac{(w - e) + bV_u}{r + b}$$

Expected Utility of a Shirker Worker

$$rV_E^s = w + (b+q) \left(V_u - V_E^s\right) \rightarrow V_E^s = rac{w + (b+q) V_u}{r+b+q}$$

Shapiro and Stiglitz Model NO SHIRKING CONDITIONS

$$V_E^N \ge V_E^s$$

 $q\left(V_{E}^{s}-V_{u}
ight)\geq e$

$$w \ge rV_u + (r+b+q) e/q \equiv \widetilde{w}$$

- Critical wage is a function of V_u and probability of unemployment
- More costly monitoring implies higher non-shirking wage

if no monitoring - anybody shirks

Employers

The Firm has to decide the wage and the quantity of labour that maximise productivity of labour, given cost of monitoring qAggregate Production Function

$$Q=F\left(L\right)$$

Aggregate Labour Demand

$$F' = \widetilde{w}$$

Market Equilibrium

- High Wages, High Unemployment, High Effort
- Low Wages, Low Unemployment, Low Effort

"Equilibrium Occurs when each firm,...,finds it optimal to offer the going wage (\tilde{w}) rather than a different wage. The key market variable which determines individual firms behaviour is V_u , the expected utility of an unemployed worker"

Equilibrium

Expecte Utility for an Employed Worker $(=V_E^N)$

$$rV_E = w - e + b\left(V_u - V_E\right)$$

Expected Utility of an Unemployed Worker

$$rV_u = \overline{w} + a\left(V_E - V_U\right)$$

Solving Simultaneously

$$rV_E = \frac{(r+a)(w-e) + b\overline{w}}{r+a+b}$$
$$rV_u = \frac{\overline{w}(b+r) + a(w-e)}{(r+a+b)}$$

Substituting in the NSC $w \ge rV_u + (r + b + q) e/q \equiv \tilde{w}$ and knowing that in steady state the flow of workers in employment a(N-L) should be equal to the flow of workers made redundant bL, we obtain the Aggregate NSC

Aggregate Non Shirking Condition

$$w \ge e + \overline{w} + (e/q)(b/u + r) \equiv \widetilde{w}$$




FIGURE 1. THE AGGREGATE NO-SHIRKING CONSTRAINT

Equilibrium

$$F'(L) = e + \overline{w} + (e/q)(b/u + r)$$




FIGURE 2. EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT

In Equilibrium Unemployment is NECESSARY to discipline workers (Old Karl Marx Idea) Unemployment and Equilibrium real wage will be higher for:

- Higher Unemployment Benefits w
- Lower Detection rate q
- Higher quit rate b


Long Term Involuntary Unemployment is a Product of Structural Inefficiency of Monitoring, Rate of Job Turnover and Labour Market Institutions (Minimum Wage, Job Security Measures, etc.)

Connecting Long Run and Short Run Unemployment -Hysteresis

- Hysteresis implies that an economy does not return to its original equilibrium after it has been exposed to some exogenous - but temporary shock.
- The reason: those who have the power to determine wages are different from the overall labour force.
 - Insiders Outsiders (Membership Theories)
 - Short Term Long Term Unemployed (Duration Theories)

Example - Effect of Financial Crisis in South Africa

GDP 2008-2013 in Selected Countries




GDP Effect Relatively Mild

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆三▶ ◆三▶ 三三 のへぐ

Example - Effect of Financial Crisis in South Africa


Employment 2008-2013 in Selected Countries



Effect on Employment: A Disaster

▲ロト ▲帰ト ▲ヨト ▲ヨト 三日 - の々ぐ

Example - Effect of Financial Crisis in South Africa



Employment and Labour Cost 2008-2013 in SA

Labour Cost Increased even When Demand for Labour Weakened

Hysteresis

Blanchard and Summers model

- Many firms in the economy (identical)
- Wage bargaining determine the nominal wage
- Firms set employment
- Demand for firm i

$$y_i = (m-p) - a(p_i - p)$$

Demand for labour by firm i

$$n_i = (m - w) - a(w_i - w)$$

Employment depends on the process of wage setting

・ロ・・西・・田・・田・ 日・ シック

Hysteresis

Blanchard and Summers model

Pure Insider Model

Employees in firm i set wages such that:

$$En_i = n_i^*$$

$$(Em - Ew) - a(w_i - Ew) = n_i^*$$

At the aggregate level this implies:

$$n = n^* + (m - Em)$$

If the number of insiders is given by the number of employed in the previous period, we have

$$n = n_{-1} + (m - Em)$$

Hysteresis

Blanchard and Summers model

- After an adverse shock that reduces employment, workers who are still employed, have no desire to cut nominal wages to increase employment
- Implications
 - equilibrium unemployment is equal to last period's value of unemployment

- no tendency to return to any fixed equilibrium
- Same results for Duration: Long Term Unemployed as Outsiders

Policy Implications

Left to themselves, Unemployment does not decrease

- Monetary Policy (and any stabilization policy) Helps
- Reduction of the Power of Insiders
- Re-franchising the Unemployed
- European Unemployment Seems to Follow This Picture.
- SA Unemployment: maybe, but the model does not need to be interpreted literally (Who are the insiders and the outsiders in SA?).
- The point is Short Run Shocks and Long Run Outcomes are not necessarily separated